In one of his essays the late humorist, Robert Benchley, spoke of his diminishing confidence during college that he could fill an inside straight in poker. The people who try to predict major influenza outbreaks go through a similar evolution. While a cyclic recurrence of the same influenza strain can be reasonably predicted on the basis of morbidity and serological data which reflect the remaining number of susceptibles in a population, the prediction of a major pandemic due to a new strain is fraught with uncertainty. This is because the events leading to the emergence of an entirely new influenza strain are both unknown and unpredictable. I agree with Beveridge [1] that major influenza mutants These facts were well known to medical and public health authorities when swine influenza produced a small outbreak involving 500 recruits at Ft. Dix, New Jersey. On serological grounds the strain resembled that responsible for the great pandemic of 1918 in its surface antigens but there was no way to measure its virulence by direct antigenic comparison since influenza virus itself was not isolated until 1931 by Shope [2] . While it seems likely that the human influenza virus of 1918 initiated an epidemic in pigs at the Cedar Rapids, Ia. Swine Show, Oct. 1918, and then persisted in this species until 1931 [3, 4] and even until the Fort Dix isolation 1976, the virus may have lost virulence for humans in this process. The presence of antibody to this strain in about 20 percent of pigs in the United States [5] and the occasional sporadic infections of humans exposed to such pigs support the view that it has persisted until 657
The work on which these comments are based was supported by grant As Begley points out, there were also other problems in the implementation of the program. These included the figure she quotes that only 45 million of the 210 million at risk received the vaccine, although later data from the National Influenza Center indicate that 31.6 percent of persons age 18 or over had been immunized in the U.S. by February 2, 1977 . In addition, there was the poor potency of the vaccine in children, the occurrence of a few fatalities in the aged, the reports of some 200 cases of the Guillain-Barre syndrome, the failure to incorporate the swine flu program into an overall immunization program (or even to include A/Victoria and B/Hong Kong influenza strains in the vaccine), the lack of effective communication with and financial support for local public health authorities, and finally the problems of liability insurance. There can be no argument about the existence of these difficulties. The haste to immunize a nation with a single vaccine may have overshadowed all other considerations. In addition, the so-called "High Risk Group"-those over age 65-were not really at high risk to swine influenza since most of this group already had antibodies to swine influenza as a result of natural infection in the period 1918-1928 when this virus was active. Further, the unique feature of the 1918 outbreak was the high mortality in young adults. In another paper [8] it is shown that 99.1 percent of persons age 18-25 in the Yale community lacked antibody to swine influenza, 98.3 percent of those age 26-35, 55 percent of those 36-59 years old, and none of those over age 60. Thus young and middle-aged adults were really the high risk group to infection, disease, and death if a 1918-like epidemic had occurred. A high mortality rate in infants and the aged would also have been expected.
Two questions might be raised: First, would Begley and others have judged the program a failure if a major pandemic had begun in the fall of 1976? It is likely that (1) a great upsweep of public participation in immunization would have occurred; (2) children and young adults would have received booster doses; (3) the cases of Guillain-Barre, which is usually a benign and transient syndrome, would have been regarded as a lesser risk than the high morbidity and mortality of an influenza pandemic; (4) President Ford, Congress, the medical authorities who advanced the program, the pharmaceutical manufacturers who made the vaccine, and the physicians and public health personnel who administered it would have been widely acclaimed for their vision and action. The epidemic did not occur and for that I am grateful. But one must ask a second question-what have we learned from it? At the least we have learned of the many medical, legal, political, and financial problems that arise in any mass immunization program and perhaps ways to avoid or modify them in the future. Hopefully, we have learned the need for more careful planning, of combining such programs with other immunization programs and of using all prevalent viruses in the vaccine strain. Hopefully, we and the public have learned that any injection, even sterile salt water, into several million people will evoke complaints of some type from some. The need for careful surveillance of both immunized and nonimmunized persons in future programs is apparent. The public should be clearly informed that a certain number of people will have fever, or Guillain-Barre syndrome, or die whether they get vaccine or not. This number should be publicized. Only when the baseline is exceeded should the possibility of a vaccine reaction be considered. The excitement of any injection may push incipient or borderline heart patients into fatal ventricular fibrillation. Any mass immunization carried out in a very short period will compress the reactions to them into a short time period so they are much more obvious. Modern communication will make their occurrence widely known. Perhaps we have learned that haste does make waste and that sins of commission are worse than those of omission. I, for one, would not view the swine flu immunization program as a total failure. Instead I would regard its cost first as an insurance premium against a pandemic that thankfully did not occur and second as the price of tuition in the school of experience.
